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It has become conventional wisdom to view the rulings handed down by the CFI in 
Airtours, Schneider, Tetra Laval and Impala as unprecedented setbacks for the European 
Commission (“the Commission”) that would usher in a new era of administrative 
accountability in the field of merger control.1 However, several commentators still 
consider that the Commission regretfully enjoys a de facto  power of “life or death” over 
notified mergers, and that judgments striking down its decisions are unlikely to change 
much in practice. Parties to a blocked merger generally abandon their projects following 
the Commission’s decision, irrespective of the outcome of the actions they may 
subsequently bring before the EC Courts (e.g. the Airtours/First Choice or 
Schneider/Legrand mergers). Third parties – competitors or consumers – to an illegally 
approved merger have little prospect of inducing the Commission to unscramble a 
consummated transaction (e.g. the Sony/BMG merger).  
 
This unsatisfactory state of affairs has led practitioners to explore other legal avenues to 
hold the Commission accountable for its mistakes.  One such possible means of redress is 
to  resort to Article 288 EC which provides that the EC shall “make good any damage 
caused by its institutions”.2 Where an EC institution such as the Commission is found 
liable for such damage, Article 235 EC grants the Community Courts jurisdiction to 
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award compensation3 In light of the virulence of some of criticism directed at the 
Commission by the CFI in the Airtours and Schneider/Legrand judgments, the parties to 
those mergers initiated proceedings against the Commission, seeking compensation for 
the unlawful prohibition of their proposed mergers.4  
 
These actions drew enthusiastic reactions from certain EC competition law experts 
which, upon close examination, appear unjustified. The legal avenue provided for by 
Article 288 EC is most likely a procedural dead-end. First, from the applicants’ 
perspective, the conditions under which the Commission’s liability can give rise to a right 
to compensation in the field of merger control are set so high by existing case-law that 
most Article 288 EC claims are likely to be dismissed as unfounded (I). Second, from a 
public policy standpoint, Article 288 EC does not constitute an adequate instrument to 
improve the Commission’s accountability for its unlawful decisions (II). 
 
I. The private applicants’ perspective - Article 288 EC as an unpromising 
remedy in the field of merger control 
 
For non-contractual liability of the Commission to arise, and thereby trigger a right to 
compensation to the benefit of the applicants, three conditions must be met.5  
 
The first condition is that the Commission must have committed a “sufficiently serious 
breach of a rule of law intended to confer rights on individuals”.6 Whether a breach of EC 
law is “sufficiently serious” will depend on the margin of discretion enjoyed by the 
Commission when adopting its decision, the factual complexity of the situations at hand 
and the difficulties in applying and/or interpreting the relevant legal provisions.7 The 
higher the margin of discretion, complexity and legal difficulty, the most egregious the 
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violation of EC law must be in order for the Commission to be held liable under Article 
288 EC.  
 
In the field of merger control, this condition is unlikely to be fulfilled as far as the 
Commission’s substantive assessment of the transaction is concerned.8 This is not to say 
that the existence of a “sufficiently serious breach” could not stem directly from the 
wording of the Courts’ judgments finding a blatant infringement of EC law. However, in 
practice, the Courts will usually prefer to assess de novo in an action for damages 
whether the Commission has committed a serious breach of EC law in the meaning of 
Article 288 EC. In this connection, it should be noted that the Court has recalled in recent 
judgments (i) the significant decisional discretion of the Commission when applying the 
provisions contained in the merger Regulation and (ii) the fact that most high-profile 
merger transactions give rise to complex legal, economic and factual questions, the 
assessment of which is usually tinged by shades of grey and unfit to a “black or white” 
approach.9 With the exception of breaches of certain procedural requirements or basic 
principles of due process, it thus appears safe to assume that the first condition for the 
application of Article 288 will only be met in a marginal set of circumstances.10 
 
The second condition is that  the applicant must have suffered a certain, specific, proven 
and quantifiable harm which – in line with classic tort law principles – may consist either  
of a damnum emergens (e.g. a loss of cost savings or of the costs of an M&A bid) or a 
lucrum cessans (e.g. a loss of future profits).11 While in principle the Courts admit claims 
of potential imminent losses, the applicant should establish that the damage actually 
occurred and at least provide a reliable estimate of the amount of such damage. In 
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practice, parties to a blocked merger will be tempted to claim the loss of any efficiency 
gains that would have been generated following the completion of their transaction.12 
Again, applicants will most likely face an uphill struggle to quantify the losses incurred. 
The difficulties in assessing any efficiency gains attributable to a merger are well-
known.13 First, certain kinds of welfare effects, such as managerial efficiency or dynamic 
efficiency are ex hypothesi not quantifiable. Second, the availability of pre-merger 
quantitative studies (for instance, studies conducted by industry analysts) is not 
particularly helpful. Many ex ante assessments of the prospective efficiency gains of a 
merger are proven unreliable ex post, once the merger is consummated.14 Their 
evidentiary value is therefore doubtful.15  
 
The third condition is that the applicant must establish the existence of a direct and 
immediate causal link between the damage and the Commission’s unlawful action. In 
practice, the parties will first have to substantiate the existence of a causal link between 
their alleged loss and the Commission’s decision. To take one example, the applicant 
may argue that absent the decision to block the merger, it could have appropriated the 
profits currently achieved by the other party to the merger.16 This line of reasoning 
appears, however, too speculative.  It could be argued that any such profits were the 
result of the other merging party’s autonomous commercial strategy, which might not 
necessarily have been pursued had the merger been authorized.  
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Second, the applicant will have to show that its loss is directly imputable to the 
Commission’s illegal decision. Again, the applicant may argue that the Commission’s 
decision is the source of an effective loss of profit, that can empirically be observed on 
the market.17 However, any observable loss of profit may be due to other exogenous 
factors such as, for instance, a sector-wide economic slowdown, an increase in the cost of 
inputs, etc. The Commission’s decision prohibiting the merger would thus not be the only 
plausible reason for the loss alleged by the applicant. While it is not the purpose of the 
present article to dwell on the complex issue of multiple causation,  we will simply note 
that it heightens the evidentiary obstacles faced by potential applicants seeking to 
quantify damages. 
 
In sum, the stringent conditions for Commission liability and right to damages set out in 
the case-law represent a high hurdle for any applicant to overcome. This intuition finds 
empirical support in the recent ruling of the CFI in Holcim, confirmed by the ECJ on 
appeal,, which dismissed a series of actions brought under Article 288 EC against 
Commission decisions applying Article 81 EC.18 
 
II. The public policy perspective – Article 288 EC as a blunt instrument to 
promote “accountability” in the field of merger control 
 
The importance of instituting effective “accountability” mechanisms where non-
majoritarian institutions take public policy decisions has long been recognized by 
political scientists. From a public policy standpoint, the case could be made that Article 
288 EC should constitute the adequate instrument to control the Commission’s use (and 
misuse) of its discretion in the field of merger control., In accordance with this line of 
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reasoning – with which we disagree-  the stringent substantive requirements set out by the 
Courts for the application of Article 288 EC could therefore be deemed overly restrictive.   
We submit that bringing the Commission’s liability under Article 288 EC into play may 
be neither a desirable nor an appropriate means to limit the Commission’s de facto 
impunity in the field of merger control.  
 
A. Should the legal requirements for the application of Article 288 EC be relaxed? 
 
Relaxing the conditions for the application of Article 288 EC in the field of merger 
control does not appear a desirable solution. As the Court emphasized in HNL, widening 
the scope of actions for damages could negatively affect the Commission’s ability to 
defend the general interest of the Community. Such a concern is particularly relevant in 
the field of merger control , not least because mergers are amongst the most sensitive and 
politicized issues the Commission has to deal with.  
 
Put simply, it should be recalled that contrary to annulment proceedings under Article 
230 EC – which only those private applicants “individually and directly concerned” by a 
Commission decision may bring – actions under Article 288 EC are available to any 
individual or natural person adversely affected by a  decision illegally adopted by the 
Commission (proof of the illegality may be brought during the proceedings 
themselves).19 As a result, should the Commission unlawfully approve a welfare-reducing 
merger – usually referred to as a type II error – most consumers would have the right to 
bring an Article 288 EC20action.  This is likely to have profoundly negative effects  In 
addition to the fact that relaxing the conditions for the application of Article 288 EC 
could clog the Courts with actions for damages, they would in all likelihood face 
insuperable difficulties in assessing the level of compensation due to any single 
consumer, . Furthermore, since actions for damages are not manifestly limited to claims 
for “competitive” damages (e.g., loss of cost savings or of unrealized profit margins), one 
could even imagine that other third parties – such as public institutions or trade unions, – 
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would have an incentive to lodge applications for compensation on the basis, for instance, 
of employment losses. 
 
Similar concerns would apply to cases where the Commission unlawfully blocked a 
merger– usually referred to as a type I error. In addition to the merging parties, Article 
288 EC proceedings would also be open to other stakeholders. For instance the merging 
parties’ upstream suppliers could seek to obtain compensation for the damages suffered 
as a result of the fact that they would have been able to sell larger quantities of supplies to 
the merged entity than to the individual companies. The merging parties’ usual customers 
could also bring claims based on the fact that the efficiencies which would have resulted 
from the merger would no longer be “passed-on” to them. In light of this plethora of 
potential applicants, the fact that the EC Courts specified stringent substantive conditions 
for the application of Article 288 EC appears all the more justified. 
 
B. Are there other, more suitable, means to make the Commission more 
accountable? 
 
It is doubtful that Article 288 EC is the right instrument to make the Commission’s more 
accountable for the decisions it adopts in the field of merger control. Indeed, it could be 
argued that the annulment proceedings provided for in Article 230 EC already provide a 
powerful mechanism to discipline the Commission. The internal administrative reforms 
recently implemented by the Commission – following in the wake of the Courts 
judgments annulling the Airtours/First Choice, Schneider/Legrand and Tetra Laval/Sidel 
merger decisions – bear testimony to the influence of the Court’s judicial review on the 
workings of the Commission, as well as to the judicial accountability of the latter.21 
 
In addition, the “fast-track” procedure for actions where time is of the essence has 
allowed the CFI to review merger decisions within a reasonable time frame, with, in 
certain cases, the possibility to obtain a judgment within seven months from the date of 
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initiation of proceedings.22 Of course, the average length of proceedings is still too long, 
but subject to further improvements (for instance, an increased recourse to interim 
measures), these procedural reforms may entitle parties to a blocked merger to implement 
their transaction following – or while awaiting – a swift annulment ruling. 
 
Should other means to increase the Commission’s accountability be explored, there are, 
arguably, preferable alternatives which have so far not been given proper consideration, 
mainly for political reasons. In that respect, the question whether further judicial reforms 
in the field of competition law should be promoted has triggered much debate lately. A 
proposal put forward by the Confederation of British Industry and subsequently backed 
by the president of the CFI, Judge Bo Versterdorf, suggested the creation of a fully-
fledged specialized competition jurisdiction, in the mould of ECJ’s the Civil Service 
Tribunal.23 
 
In our view, placing the Commission under the scrutiny of judges with considerable 
competition law expertise would certainly contribute to increase its accountability in the 
field of merger control. Given that the main errors identified by the CFI in the 
Commission’s Airtours/First Choice, Schneider/Legrand and Tetra Laval/Sidel decisions 
concerned substantive issues (although the Commission was also found to have 
committed blatant procedural violations), it is of the utmost importance that during its 
examination of a notified merger, the Commission bears in mind that its decision will be 
reviewed in substance by expert judges – preferably well versed in industrial economics – 
which will doubtless put its substantive findings to the test. Of course, it may be argued 
that the CFI’s rulings in those cases showed that the Court is already well equipped to 
deal with the complex issues likely to arise in the assessment of mergers. However, the 
creation of a specialized competition tribunal can be expected to improve that the quality 
of judicial review, and provide increased incentives for aggrieved parties to bring cases 
before a specialized jurisdiction  
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While there maybe a number of justified objections - which cannot be examined here - to 
the creation  of a specialized antitrust court in Luxembourg, such a solution would not, 
from a purely legal standpoint, pose much difficulty: this possibility has been specifically  
provided for in the EC Treaty since 2005.24 The main obstacle to the setting up of such a 
jurisdiction is of a political nature. Following the entry into force of the Nice Treaty, the 
creation of a specialized EC court requires the unanimous support of all Member States.25 
In the current overall political context , it is doubtful that the Member States would 
actively support any measure designed to improve the institutional design of European 
competition law, as it appears to be one of the least popular areas of European public 
policy. In addition, the creation of a specialized Court within the EC legal order is likely 
to face opposition from some EC magistrates themselves, as it would in all likelihood 
entail the appointment of economists to serve as judges in Luxembourg, and in turn 





Successful actions for damages the field of merger control will most likely remain 
confined to exceptional cases where the Commission is shown to have made egregious 
errors. We do not view this as a necessarily bad outcome In our opinion, the stringent 
conditions under which the Community can currently be held liable for Commission 
decisions blocking or approving mergers are appropriate. Any relaxation of these 
conditions would most likely result in  a flood of dilatory applications which would 
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congest the Courts, and in turn encourage the Commission to be excessively cautious 
when reviewing merger transactions. If we wish to increase the Commission’s 
accountability in this area, other mechanisms – such as for instance a revision of the 
current procedural and judicial architecture – are probably more appropriate. 
 
